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Abstract 
Agricultural credit programs in lesser developed countries (LDCs) 
frequently incorporate low interest rates to benefit small farmers. This 
paper investigates the role of transaction costs (in addition to 
interest rate charges) as a logical rationing mechanism in agricultural 
credit markets in LDCs that in effect creates unanticipated and unde-
sired results among borrowers. Recent research in five LDCs suggest 
that the intended effect of credit policies to promote uniformly low 
interest rates to all borrowers is not attained in practice. Instead a 
skewed, regressive incidence of total costs (interest rates plus trans-
action costs) on borrowers emerges. A more detailed study i~e of 
these countries indicates that transaction costs as a percent of loan 
amount decrease with loan size, decline with increases in the interest 
rate (reflecting a "trade-off" relationship), are more significant for 
small than for large loans, and are higher for private than for develop-
ment bank loans at given loan sizes and interest rates. This trade-off 
(i.e. the negative elasticity between the interest rate and transaction 
costs) is larger for private banks than for the development bank, sug-
gesting that private banks are more responsive and flexible in adjusting 
their loan procedures to a changing regulatory environment. Finally, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, an increase in the explicit interest 
rate on loans would have a progressive impact, since it would reduce 
transaction costs more for small than for large loans. 
1. 
Rationing Agricultural Credit in LDCs: The Role and 
Determinants of Transaction Costs for Borrowers 
Introduction 
Transaction costs in financial intermediation are a measure of the 
"friction" existing in the functioning of financial markets. The higher 
the costs of intermediation, the less efficient the performance of the 
financial sector in resource allocation and distribution. Transaction 
costs frequently increase as a result of regulations imposed on financial 
markets, such as interest-rate restrictions and selective credit poli-
cies. Financial intermediaries circumvent interest-rate regulations 
through non-price mechanisms that generate transaction costs for lenders 
and borrowers, whereas selective credit policies usually carry built-in 
cost-increasing procedures and requirements. 
In this paper we investigate the role of transaction costs of 
borrowing as a rationing mechanism in the agricultural credit markets of 
five less-developed countries. We show that borrowing transaction costs 
become an effective non-price rationing device in these markets. We 
further argue that the results of these rationing practices are regres-
sive, despite the intended distributional goals of low-interest rate 
credit policies and small-farmer credit allocations schemes. We also 
investigate the main determinants of borrowing transaction costs, and 
show that an inverse relationship exists between the level of the expli-
cit interest rate charged on loans and the magnitude of these transaction 
costs. Our findings indicate that both development banks and private 
banks pass on transaction costs to borrowers as an implicit-pricing mech-
anism to ration out undesired clients. Private banks are generally more 
effective in doing this than development banks, and at the same time, 
more responsive to changes in the interest-rate structure. 
We first present a summary and discussion of recent evidence on the 
levels and degree of regressiveness of borrowing transaction costs in 
agricultural credit. The next section deals with the main determinants 
of these costs borne by farmer borrowers, emphasizing the trade-off be-
tween transaction costs and interest rates on the one hand, and the dif-
ferences between private bank and development bank behavior on the other 
hand. Major conclusions follow. 
2. Borrowing Transactions Costs in LDCs: A Review of Recent Research 
This section draws upon results from field surveys reported in five 
different studies of agricultural credit programs undertaken between 1981 
and 1983. Four of these studies correspond to Latin-American countries: 
Honduras (Cuevas), Ecuador, Panama and Peru (Inter-American Development 
Bank), while the fifth study was undertaken in Bangladesh (Ahmed). These 
surveys document the explicit and implicit non-interest costs incurred by 
farmer-borrowers in the process of securing and repaying loans. Expli-
cit costs consist primarily of transportation, lodging, and meal expen-
ses associated with trips to the bank's office, and fees and other cash 
payments for documents and legal procedures. Implicit costs correspond 
to the opportunity cost of time spent by farmers in negotiating and 
securing their loans. 
The most important common characteristic of all five case studies is 
a low nominal interest rate to provide subsidized credit to small and 
medium-sized farms. These rates implied negative real interest rates in 
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three cases: -3 percent in Bangladesh, -0.5 percent in Ecuador, and -22 
percent in Peru. In the other two cases the resulting real interest 
rates were positive (i.e. 3.3 percent in Honduras, and 2 percent in Pana-
ma) though still clearly subsidized when taking into account the opportun-
ity cost of capital in these societies. 
Table 1 summarizes the results reported in the five- country-studies. 
Panel A presents the magnitude of transaction costs as a percent of the 
loan amount. In panel B, these transaction costs have .been expressed as 
a proportion of the explicit-interest charges documented in the case 
studies. This proportion indicates the relative importance of transac-
tion costs vis a vis explicit interest charges. In both panels we 
report the sample average of each measure, and the results for three 
loan-size categories. 
Transaction costs as a percent of the loan amount vary between 1.2% 
(Peru) and 21.7% (Bangladesh), and the magnitudes across countries and 
loan-size categories range from 0.2% to almost 30%. There is a striking 
contrast between the results shown for Bangladesh and those reported for 
the Latin-American countries. This contrast is accounted for by the 
unusually small loan sizes characteristic of the Bangladesh survey in 
comparison to those recorded in Latin America. This contrast is also 
reflected in panel B, where transaction costs are expressed as a percent 
of explicit-interest charges. Here transaction costs for Bangladesh are 
on average almost twice as large as the explicit interest charged on 
loans, whereas in the Latin-American cases they represent between 4% and 
46% of explicit interest. With the exception of Peru, the findings sug-
gest that borrowing transaction costs play an important role as implicit 
prices in these credit markets. Their magnitude certainly cannot be 
ignored by prospective borrowers. Loan procedures established by lenders 
create these transaction costs and should be interpreted as rationing or 
screening devices. These mechanisms substitute for explicit prices 
(i.e., interest rates) that are constrained under the regulatory schemes 
prevailing in these markets. , 
The figures in table 1 also highlight the distributional effects of 
credit rationing through this implicit pricing. In all cases the inci-
dence of transaction costs by loan-size categories is clearly regressive 
with small loans bearing high costs and large loans entailing the lowest 
borrowing transaction costs as a percent of the loan. In relative terms, 
transaction costs for small loans in Honduras are almost thirty times as 
high as those associated with large loans, 8.8 times as high in Ecuador, 
4.2 times in Bangladesh, 3.9 times in Peru, and 2.9 times in Panama. 
We conclude that the intended effect of credit policies promoting a 
low and relatively uniform interest rate among borrowers is not attained 
in practice. Instead, a skewed, regressive structure of total credit 
costs (interest rate plus transaction costs) is obtained. Even when the 
administered rates are set so that small loans are charged a lower rate 
than medium or large loans, as is the case in the Ecuador study, trans-
action costs more than offset the explicit interest-rate differential 
(two percentage points in the Ecuador case). 
3. Some Determinants of Borrowing Transaction Costs: 
Interest Rates and Lending Institutions 
The Honduras case provided information on transaction costs borne by 
clients of the development bank, private banks, and credit unions. Len-
ders were constrained by a narrow range of explicit interest rates they 
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'f 3 Table 1. Borrowing Transaction Costs at the Farm Level 
in Selected Countries, by Loan Size. 
Transaction Costs 
By Loan Size Bangladesh Ecuador Honduras -Panama Peru 
A. Transaction Costs as 
Percent of Loan Amount 
Sample Average 21.7% 2.8% 3.0% 5.2% 1.2% 
Small Loans 29.4 5.3 5.9 5.7 3.9 
Medium Loans 17.5 2.0 1.6 3.0 1.3 
Large Loans _7. 0 0.6 0.2 2.0 1.0 
B. Transaction Costs as 
Percent of Explicit-
Interest Charges~/ 
Sample Average 180.8% 22.9% 23.1% 46.4% ' 4.0% 
Small Loans 245.0 47.7 45.4 50.9 13.0 
Medium Loans 145.8 17.3 12.3 26.8 4.3 
Large Loans 58.1 4.1 1.5 17.9 3.3 
Sources: Bangladesh, Ahmed; Honduras, Cuevas; Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, 
Inter-American Development Bank. 
a/ Computed based on the levels of explicit interest rate reported in the 
different sources, e.g., for Bangladesh the average transaction costs 
in panel A is 21.7% and the explicit rate reported by Ahmed is 1_2%_~ 
therefore (21.7/12) * 100 = 180.8%. 
could charge on loans, therefore they used selective and discriminatory 
application of their loan procedures to screen and ration out loan appli-
cants. Transaction costs were passed on to borrowers in direct propor-
tion to the perceived risk involved in the different loan operations. 
A trade-off equation was estimated between borrowing transaction 
costs and the explicit interest rate charged on loans. In this estima-
tion a generalized power function was specified wit~ transaction costs 
as a function of the explicit interest rate, the area of the farm, the 
loan amount, a set of dummy variables to account for loan source (devel-
opment bank, private banks, credit unions), and another set of dummy 
variables that captured the effect of loan end-use.l/ 
As expected, transaction costs as a percent of the loan amount were 
a decreasing function of the loan amount. Transaction costs per loan are 
an increasing function of loan amount, however, the elasticity of this 
function is less than one, therefore transaction costs per loan increase 
at a decreasing rate as loan size increases. As a result, transaction 
costs per unit of money borrowed decrease as the loan amount increases. 
The results obtained for the effect of the interest rate on trans-
action costs were also significant and stable across different specifi-
cations. Overall, the coefficient associated with the direct effect of 
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the interest rate on transaction costs was not significantly different 
from -1. This finding indicates that there is a trade-off between trans-
action costs of borrowing and the nominal interest rate charged on loans, 
such that a one-percent increase in the interest rate will bring about a 
one percent decrease in borrowing transaction costs. _ 
The foregoing general results for the overall sample are broken down 
in table 2 controlling for both the loan source and the loan-size. For 
simplicity, only two loan sources (development bank, private banks) and 
two loan-size categories are defined here. The first column of table 2 
indicates the estimated transaction costs as a percent of the loan 
amount. It is evident from these figures that borrowing from private 
banks is about twice as expensive as borrowing from the development bank, 
a finding that suggests a greater ability of private banks to pass on 
transaction costs to borrowers. The skewed, regressive incidence of 
transaction costs by loan size is clear in table 2, regardless of the 
lending institution involved. 
Column two of table 2 reports the elasticity of transaction costs 
with respect to the interest rate for different combinations of loan 
source and loan size. Borrowing transaction costs are very elastic to 
changes in the interest rate fn the case of private banks. For these 
loans the absolute value of the elasticity is three to five times as 
large as the values obtained for the development bank. In the latter, 
large loans show a unitary elasticity whereas for small loans the re-
sponse of transaction costs to changes in the interest rate is inelastic 
(significantly less than zero and greater than -1). For small-loan oper-
ations, the absolute value of the elasticity is lower than the values 
obtained for large loans, denoting a less flexible response. This is 
expected, since smaller loans are associated with more rigid and cumber-
some targeting schemes. 
Table 2. Borrowing Transaction Costs as Percent of Loan Amount (t), 
Elasticities of t with respect to Changes in the Explicit 
Interest Rate (i), and 'Changes int with Increases in i, 
by Lender and Loan Size. 
Lender/Loan Size 
Development Bank 
Small Loans 
Large Loans 
Private Banks 
Small Loans 
Large Loans 
Estimated Value 
of Transaction 
Costs (t)a/ 
% 
2.85 
0.38 
5.77 
0.77 
Estimated 
Value of 
Elasticityb/ 
e(t,i) 
-0.5551 
-0.8425~/ 
-2.6692 
-2.9566 
Change in t 
with a one-point 
increase in the 
interest rate (i) 
pct. points 
-0.123 
-0.025 
-1.184 
-0.175 
Source: Cuevas. Detailed results of the estimated function available 
from the authors. See note 1/. 
a/ Estimates evaluated at geometric means of farm area and interest rate. 
~/ All estimates significantly different from zero. 
cl Not significantly different from -1. 
1 
5 
The response of transaction costs in percentage points to a one-
point increase in the interest rate were calculated based on the elastici-
ties discussed above. These are presented in the last column of table 2. 
This response is considerably larger for private-bank loans. A one-point 
increase in the explicit interest rate will lead to a larger compensatory 
decline in borrowing transaction costs in private-bank loans than in the 
case of loans from the development bank. This result shows that private 
banks are more responsive and flexible in adjusting the~r loan procedures 
and requirements to changes in the regulatory environment. 
In both lending institutions the compensatory change in borrowing 
transaction costs as a result of an increase in the interest rate is 
considerably larger for small loans than for large loans. This implies . 
that a one-point increase in the interest rate will be almost fully trans-
lated into a corresponding increase in total borrowing costs (i.e., inter-
est rate plus transaction costs) in the case of large loans, since the 
compensating effect of reduced transaction costs is very small. For 
small loans however, this offsetting response of transaction costs is far 
more important. Thus an increase in the explicit interest rate will be 
partially compensated by the resulting reduction in borrowing transaction 
costs. Since this offsettinl effect occurs for increases as well as 
decreases in the level of the interest rate, it follows that further 
reductions in the interest rate on loans will benefit primarily borrowers 
of large amounts, instead of farmers borrowing small loans. In this 
sense, cheap-credit policies will not attain their intended distribution-
al goals in the rural sector. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the role of transaction costs of 
borrowing as a rationing mechanism in agricultural credit markets in less 
developed countries. Results of recent research in five LDCs suggest 
that the intended effect of credit policies involving a low and relative-
ly uniform interest rate is not attained. Instead, a skewed, regressive 
structure of total credit costs (interest rate plus transaction costs) is 
obtained. 
The estimation of a transaction-costs function based on data from 
one of the case studies above indicated that loan amount, interest rate, 
and loan source are significant determinants of the level of transaction 
costs. Transaction costs as a percent of the loan amount decrease with 
loan size, decline with increases in the interest rate (i.e., the trade-
off relationship), and are higher for private-bank loans than development-
bank loans, at given loan sizes and interest rate. The trade-off (nega-
tive elasticity) is larger in private banks than in the development bank, 
and is more significant for small loans than for large loans. We con-
clude that, under interest rate restrictions, private banks are more 
effective in passing on intermediation costs to borrowers than develop-
ment banks. At the same time, private banks are more responsive to 
changes in the interest-rate structure, and more flexible in adjusting 
their loan procedures and requirements to a changing regulatory environ-
ment. Finally, contrary to conventional wisdom, an increase in the ex-
plicit interest rate on loans would have a progressive impact, since it 
would reduce transaction costs more for small loans than for large loans. 
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Notes 
The transaction-costs function estimated here is: 
lnT = a 0 + a 1lnA + a 2ln1 + a 301n(i) + a 31 sln(i) + a 32D1ln(i) + 
a 33D2ln(i) + a 34Fln(i) + b1D1 + b2D2 + c 1u1 + c2u2 + c 3u3 
where, 
T is the borrowing (non-interest) transaction costs per loan, 
A is the area of the farm, 
L is the loan amount, 
i is the explicit interest rate that can be charged on the loan 
by the lender, 
S is the dummy variable for loan-size category, 
S=l if the loan amount is less than or equal to L. 2,000, 
S=O otherwise, 
D1 and Dz are dummy variables that account for deviations 
of T in private banks and credit unions with respect to the 
development bank,- that is used as the base or level of 
reference, 
F is a dummy variable for farm-size category, 
F=l if the area of the farm is less than or equal to 20 
hectares 
F=O otherwise, 
U1, Uz, and U3 are dummy variables defined to capture the 
effects on transaction costs of different loan-uses: basic 
grains, export crops, and livestock, as deviations with 
respect to a miscellaneous end-use category conformed by all 
other end-uses in_agriculture (land purchases, trade, 
vegetable crops, and others). 
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